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INTRODUCTION 
magine two similar-sounding stories. In the first, a 
methamphetamine dealer purchases a half ounce of product, which 
she gives to her husband to resell to his customers. In the second, a 
different methamphetamine dealer regularly purchases two ounces of 
product at a time from his supplier to resell to his customers. Both 
dealers are ultimately prosecuted for conspiring to distribute a 
controlled substance under the Controlled Substances Act1 and are 
convicted, but the results on appeal are dramatically different. In the 
first scenario, the defendant’s conviction is affirmed, and she is 
sentenced to twelve years in prison. In the second, the defendant’s 
conviction is overturned because the court determines that the evidence 
is insufficient to convict for conspiracy, and he gets off completely 
scot-free.2 
As it turns out, these scenarios and the disparity in their outcomes 
are more than just hypothetical—each comes from a real federal case 
decided during the past three years. The reason for such a dramatic 
difference in these cases’ outcomes is a circuit split in the interpretation 
of an obscure rule of federal drug conspiracy law: the buyer-seller rule. 
The buyer-seller rule is the concept in conspiracy jurisprudence that an 
illegal transaction between a buyer and a seller of controlled substances 
is insufficient alone to establish that the buyer and seller are members 
in a conspiracy to distribute drugs. Every circuit has adopted some 
version of the buyer-seller rule. Where the circuits differ, however, is 
in what more the government must show beyond a simple buy-sell 
transaction to establish a conspiratorial relationship. It is this difference 
1 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). 
2 The first scenario comes from United States v. Gallegos, 784 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 
2015). The second scenario comes from United States v. Loveland, 825 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
I 
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that is producing such a wide disparity in sentencing for similar 
conduct. 
This Comment endeavors first and foremost to shine a spotlight on 
that issue, making clear the significance of the discrepancy in 
interpretation and advocating for a uniform national rule. Beyond just 
the need for a general resolution, however, this Comment will argue 
that the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ interpretation of the buyer-seller 
rule is the most appropriate as it more accurately conforms to the 
historical definition of a conspiracy and more appropriately deters the 
conduct that makes conspiracies so dangerous. In doing so, this 
Comment provides a comparison of buyer-seller rule jurisprudence 
across jurisdictions. 
In light of current federal prosecution priorities and resource 
distribution, robust examination and evaluation of federal drug laws are 
extremely valuable in clearing up any inconsistency in their 
administration. According to the most recently available data from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, drug trafficking offenses were the single 
most-charged type of crime across all federal jurisdictions.3 Moreover, 
it is unclear whether this trend will change any time in the near future 
as the Trump administration has frequently taken a strong antidrug 
position since assuming office. For example, in January of 2018, 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded President Obama’s policy on 
the enforcement of marijuana drug offenses, giving federal prosecutors 
significantly wider latitude to enforce the federal prohibition on 
marijuana in states that have legalized it.4 Additionally, President 
Trump himself made several comments in March of 2018 suggesting 
that drug traffickers should be subjected to harsher and more frequent 
punishment, even alluding to the death penalty at one point.5 Although 
the likelihood of the President attempting to follow through on such a 
remark is unclear, one thing is clear—federal drug law is going to be at 
3 MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2014 – 
STATISTICAL TABLES 16 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs14st.pdf. 
4 Charlie Savage & Jack Healy, Trump Administration Takes Step That Could Threaten 
Marijuana Legalization Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2018/01/04/us/politics/marijuana-legalization-justice-department-prosecutions.html?_r=0. 
5 Editorial Board, Trump Wants the Death Penalty for Drug Dealers. Here’s What Would 
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the forefront of our national political discourse for at least the next few 
years. 
In exploring this issue, this Comment is divided into several 
different parts. Part I explores what a conspiracy is and discusses the 
doctrine of conspiracy’s historical basis. Part II describes and compares 
in detail the different approaches of the Ninth, Seventh, and Tenth 
Circuits. Part III makes a case for the adoption of the Ninth and Seventh 
Circuits’ approach and explains the shortcomings in the Tenth Circuit’s 
alternative approach. Finally, part IV addresses some 
counterarguments to be made in favor of the Tenth Circuit’s stricter 
approach. 
I 
WHAT IS A CONSPIRACY? 
A. A Brief History of Conspiracy
The modern conspiracy doctrine was famously described by Judge 
Learned Hand as the “darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery” both 
because of its widespread usage and the utility that it provides to 
prosecutors.6 Although modern criminal conspiracy doctrine 
experiences widespread usage because of its power, the doctrine took 
quite some time to evolve to where it stands today. 
Like many modern crimes and civil causes of action, the doctrine of 
criminal conspiracy traces its roots all the way back to the ancient 
English common law.7 At the time, there were effectively two different 
ways of prosecuting felonies: trial by battle or a public investigation 
conducted by a grand jury–like body.8 This system suffered from a 
number of headaches, however, not the least of which was the 
prevalence of false, baseless accusations.9 In order to curtail this 
practice, fines were imposed against those who brought frivolous 
accusations.10 Unfortunately, these fines only succeeded in forcing 
those abusing the system to become more creative. Frivolous accusers 
began gaming the system by using children to bring false claims, in 
order to insulate themselves from liability because children could 
6 Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925); see also Kevin Jon Heller, 
Whatever Happened to Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Of Drug Conspiracies, Overt 
Acts, and United States v. Shabani, 49 STAN. L. REV. 111, 111 (1996) (quoting Harrison). 
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neither be fined nor outlawed for bringing false claims.11 Accordingly, 
to continue holding abusers of the system accountable, the first statutes 
were passed criminalizing the actual act of plotting to cause some sort 
of harm: 
Conspirators be they that do confeder or bind themselves by Oath, 
Covenant, or other Alliance, that every of them shall aid and support 
the Enterprise of each other falsely and maliciously to indite, or cause 
to be indited [or falsely to acquit people] or falsely to move or 
maintain Pleas; and also such as cause Children within Age to appeal 
Men of Felony, whereby they are imprisoned and sore grieved; and 
such as retain Men with their Liveries or Fees for to maintain their 
malicious Enterprises; [and to suppress the truth] as well the Takers 
as the Givers. And Stewards and Bailiffs of great Lords, which, by 
their Seignory, Office, or Power, undertake to maintain or support 
[Quarrels, Pleas, or Debates] [for other Matters] than such as touch 
the Estate of their Lords or themselves.12 
This was only the beginning for the conspiracy doctrine, however. 
Over the years, the doctrine evolved from a means of punishing those 
plotting to interfere with the law’s administration to a mechanism of 
punishing those collaborating to violate the law.13 In fact, some 
jurisdictions even took this one step further and started using the 
conspiracy doctrine as a catchall means of prosecuting those engaging 
in acts widely considered immoral but not necessarily criminal. This 
shift is memorialized perhaps most famously in Hawkins’s Pleas of the 
Crown, which provides that “all confederacies whatsoever, wrongfully 
to prejudice a third person, are highly criminal at common law.”14 
This particular use is exemplified in some early American cases, like 
New Hampshire’s State v. Burnham.15 In Burnham, the defendants 
were convicted of conspiracy when they issued fraudulent insurance 
policies to various individuals in order to give those individuals the 
right to vote in the Rockingham Mutual Fire Insurance Company’s 
election for its board of directors.16 This, the defendants hoped, would 
lead to the election of particular board members who would then help 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 396 (quoting THIRD ORDINANCE OF CONSPIRATORS, 33 Edw. I, st. 2 (1304)). 
13 Id. at 400. 
14 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN: OR, A SYSTEM OF 
THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER 
HEADS 190 (6th ed. 1788). 
15 15 N.H. 396 (Super. Ct. 1844). 
16 Id. at 397. 
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the defendants get jobs.17 On appeal, the New Hampshire Superior 
Court of Judicature upheld the defendants’ convictions on the grounds 
that, although the defendants’ actions were not explicitly illegal, the 
aggregation of their immoral acts for a common purpose threatens the 
peace and order of society and therefore requires their repression.18 
New Hampshire was not alone in coming to this conclusion. In 
Alabama’s State v. Murphy, the defendants were convicted of 
conspiracy when they plotted to fabricate a marriage license to trick the 
victim into marrying the defendant.19 Though the court refused to 
decide whether this deception was actually illegal under the letter of 
the law, it was apparently untroubled in affirming the defendants’ 
conviction as the act was “eminently immoral” and therefore merited 
“the full measure of reprehension with which it is visited by the law.”20 
The era of using the conspiracy doctrine to regulate anything deemed 
immoral would not last forever, though it took some jurisdictions 
longer than others to succumb to the tide of change. In New Hampshire, 
Burnham was implicitly overturned seventeen years later in State v. 
Straw.21 In Straw, the court held that two defendants convicted of 
plotting to commit civil trespass could not be guilty of conspiracy 
because, although such an act is immoral, the underlying act itself is 
not criminal if committed by a single person.22 
Alabama would ultimately come around to this way of thinking as 
well but not until just over a century later in 1946 in Mitchell v. State.23 
In Mitchell, the defendants were accused of conspiring to forge 
evidence falsely indicating that several individuals were residents of 
wards within the Mobile, Alabama, voting precinct.24 Oddly enough, 
this act, though immoral, was not actually considered criminal at the 
time.25 Accordingly, the court held that the defendants could not be 
convicted of conspiracy because “[t]he only code form for conspiracy 
relates to conspiracy to commit a felony or misdemeanor.”26 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 402. 
19 6 Ala. 765, 765–66 (1844). 
20 Id. at 769–70. 
21 42 N.H. 393 (Super. Ct. 1861). 
22 Id. at 397. 
23 27 So. 2d 36 (Ala. 1946). 
24 Id. at 40. 
25 Id. at 37. 
26 Id. 
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The recognition that conspiracy is a doctrine specifically punishing 
agreements to violate the criminal law, rather than just punishing 
engagement in immoral acts, in no small part helped give rise to the 
modern understanding of the crime. 
B. Modern Conspiracy
In the modern era, the crime of conspiracy is viewed in the broadest 
sense as a sort of criminal partnership wherein two people agree to 
commit one or more crimes.27 This agreement does not have to be 
formal in the sense that all the conspiracy’s members sat down and 
agreed on every detail of how to carry out their scheme, but the 
members must have at least agreed in some way to commit the 
crimes.28 In most jurisdictions, this breaks down into two or three 
elements. First, the conspirators must have come to some sort of 
“agreement to accomplish an illegal objective.”29 Second, at the time 
the agreement is made, the conspirators must have the intent to commit 
the offense about which they are conspiring.30 Finally, some statutes 
impose an additional requirement that at least one conspirator takes an 
overt act in furtherance of their agreement.31 In practice, because it is 
incredibly rare that there will ever be direct evidence of the actual 
agreement between the parties, the prosecution will generally prove its 
case through circumstantial evidence of conspirators working in 
concert.32 
In many ways, conspiracy is similar to the theory of aiding and 
abetting, which holds a codefendant criminally liable to the same 
degree as the principal actor if the codefendant knowingly assists with 
the crime.33 After all, both conspiracy and aiding and abetting involve 
a confederation of at least two people acting together to allow for the 
commission of a crime. Where these doctrines part ways, however, is 
in the level and scope of commitment to the offense that the other party 
27 See, e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.20 (9TH CIR. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS COMM. 2010); Note, Falcone Revisited: The Criminality of Sales to an 
Illegal Enterprise, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 228, 228 (1953) [hereinafter Falcone Revisited]. 
28 Falcone Revisited, supra note 27. 
29 United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). 
30 Benjamin M. Dooling & Marissa A. Lalli, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 47 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 561, 564 (2010). 
31 United States v. Winslow, 962 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1992). 
32 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946). 
33 Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 70–71 (2014). 
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has to demonstrate. Under an aiding and abetting theory, the assisting 
party need only in some way knowingly assist another in the 
commission of a criminal act.34 This can even be something as 
insignificant as providing encouragement to the other party in 
committing the offense.35 Conspiracy, by contrast, is a much more 
involved crime as it requires the collusion of two parties before 
committing a crime to come to an agreement to assist each other in 
committing a criminal offense.36 
The greater level of involvement necessary for participation in a 
conspiracy is reflected in the severity of the punishment for committing 
the offense. Though conspiracy statutes on their faces appear to 
function just like aiding and abetting statutes by punishing conspirators 
as if they had committed the substantive offense themselves,37 the 
statutes really get their teeth through a special, additional form of 
criminal liability lurking beneath the surface called Pinkerton liability. 
Pinkerton liability is derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pinkerton v. United States wherein two brothers, Walter and Daniel 
Pinkerton, were charged with and convicted of several counts of 
violating and conspiring to violate the Internal Revenue Code.38 
Unsatisfied with the resolution, Daniel sought review in the Supreme 
Court, arguing that his conspiracy conviction was improper as it was 
sustained entirely based on his brother’s conduct, not his own.39 The 
Court rejected Daniel’s argument and instead held that the defendant in 
a conspiracy case can be held criminally liable not just for acts he 
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, but also for the reasonably 
foreseeable illegal acts of his coconspirators.40 The doctrine handed 
down in Pinkerton represents a massive expansion of criminal liability 
for conspirators that makes the determination of whether someone is 
committing a crime alone or as a part of a conspiracy all the more 
important. 
34 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law: Substantive Principles § 174 (2018). 
35 Id. 
36 See MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.20 (9TH CIR. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS COMM. 2010). 
37 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 846 
(2012). 
38 328 U.S. 640, 641 (1946). 
39 Id. at 642, 645. 
40 Id. at 647–48; see also Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due Process 
Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 94–95 (2006) (discussing 
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640). 
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Furthermore, the importance of the conspiracy doctrine can hardly 
be understated, given how prevalent its application has become in 
criminal law. Congress has applied the conspiracy doctrine either 
directly to most major federal crimes through individual statutes41 or 
indirectly to all federal crimes through the general conspiracy statute.42 
The widespread application of the conspiracy doctrine once prompted 
Justice Jackson to describe it as “chameleon-like, tak[ing] on a special 
coloration from each of the many independent offenses on which it may 
be overlaid.”43 Although many of these different statutes put their own 
unique spin on the doctrine, the particular statute that this Comment 
focuses on is the drug-conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, as that is the 
section that the buyer-seller rule stems from. 
C. The Drug Conspiracy Statute and the Development of the Buyer-
Seller Rule 
The Controlled Substances Act was enacted in 1970.44 A subsection 
of the act, 21 U.S.C. § 846, provides that “[a]ny person who attempts 
or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be 
subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the 
commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”45 
Although there are many other sections that § 846 can be applied to, 
one of the most common is 21 U.S.C. § 841, which effectively prohibits 
conspiracies to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with 
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance.”46 Though there is a wide variety of evidence that courts 
have considered sufficient to prove that the defendant agreed to violate 
this section, it is subject to one important judicially created limitation: 
the buyer-seller rule.47 The buyer-seller rule provides that criminal 
liability for conspiring to distribute drugs cannot be found solely based 
on evidence of the sale of drugs from a seller to a buyer.48 
41 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1349; 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); 21 U.S.C. § 846. 
42 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
43 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
44 Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 846). 
45 21 U.S.C. § 846. 
46 21 U.S.C § 841(a) (2012). 
47 See United States v. Wexler, 522 F.3d 194, 210–11 (2d Cir. 2008) (Raggi, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the buyer-seller rule). 
48 Id. at 211. 
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This rule traces its roots all the way back to the 1940s when the 
Supreme Court decided United States v. Falcone.49 In Falcone, the 
respondents were wholesalers who sold sugar, yeast, and cans to a 
number of the principal defendants who used them for the illegal 
distillation of spirits.50 The respondents were indicted for conspiracy, 
although the indictment did not allege that they had any knowledge of 
the conspiracy itself but rather that they had knowledge that the goods 
they sold would be used for illegal purposes.51 The Supreme Court 
overturned the respondents’ convictions, however, holding that 
knowledge that the materials would be put to illegal use alone was not 
enough to find that the defendants were participants in a conspiracy.52 
The government would have to go one step further and show that the 
defendants knew that they were participating in a conspiracy.53 
Although Falcone is about the distribution of legal goods as opposed 
to drugs, it represents the beginning of the idea that selling a good with 
knowledge that you are contributing to its illegal use is not the same as 
conspiring to distribute it.54 
The Court revisited the issue again nine years later in Direct Sales 
Co. v. United States but this time in reference to illicit drugs.55 In that 
case, the defendant was a corporation that was charged with conspiring 
to commit a number of offenses involving the illegal distribution of 
morphine.56 The charges included everything from distributing 
morphine without paying the required tax to ordering morphine for 
purposes outside of legitimate business.57 The government alleged that 
the defendant shipped morphine to a doctor in South Carolina in 
quantities so inordinately large that no reasonable person could have 
believed that it was being used for legitimate purposes.58 Specifically, 
the government introduced evidence showing that the defendant 
49 311 U.S. 205 (1940). 
50 Id. at 206–07. 
51 Id. at 207. 
52 Id. at 210. 
53 Id. 
54 See Ryan Thomas Grace, Defining the Sprawling Arms of Conspiracy: The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Correctly Addressed the “Clean Breast” 
Doctrine as It Affects Withdrawal from a Conspiracy in United States v. Grimmett, 35 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 433, 443 (2002) (discussing Falcone, 311 U.S. 205). 
55 319 U.S. 703, 705 (1943). 
56 Id. at 704. 
57 Id. at 704–05. 
58 Id. at 705. 
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shipped as many as 5000 to 6000 tablets per month to the doctor—
enough for the doctor to prescribe 400 average-sized doses per day.59 
On appeal, the defendant, invoking Falcone, argued that it could not be 
convicted of conspiracy even if it knew that the product it was selling 
was being used illegally.60 The Court found that this argument fell short 
of dispositive, however, explaining that Falcone provides that a 
defendant cannot be convicted of a conspiracy based solely on its 
knowledge that the goods it is selling are being used illegally.61 
Nothing in Falcone provides that the defendant cannot be convicted of 
the conspiracy if the government goes one step further and produces 
evidence that the defendant sold the illegal goods in knowing support 
of a conspiracy.62 Here, there was a whole constellation of other 
evidence that supported the inference that the defendant knew it was 
participating in a conspiracy.63 Particularly important is the fact that 
morphine, unlike the sugar, yeast, and cans in Falcone, has a distinct 
propensity for illegal use in and of itself.64 Although this fact is also 
not enough to support an inference of a conspiracy, it does affect the 
amount of proof necessary to infer such knowledge.65 Otherwise 
innocuous factors like high quantities of sales, high pressure sales 
methods, or sudden increases in the volume of sales take on a new 
significance in a situation where the good being sold has such a high 
propensity for illegal use.66 These factors can actually support the 
inference that the defendant knew not only that the goods it was selling 
were being put to illegal uses but also that it was supplying and 
benefiting from an illegal enterprise.67 Thus, the defendant could be 
held criminally liable for conspiracy.68 
So, where did Direct Sales Co. ultimately leave buyer-seller rule 
jurisprudence? Distilled down to its essence, this case means that when 
the good sold is illegal or is prone to illegal use, the defendant can be 
convicted of conspiracy if the government can prove that the defendant 
59 Id. at 706. 
60 Id. at 708. 
61 Id. at 709. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 710. 
65 Id. at 711. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 714–15. 
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not only sold the good knowing it would be put to illegal use but also 
knew it was supporting an illegal enterprise. Unfortunately, however, 
the opinion is unclear about what the government has to show to prove 
these things. From this murk, two separate schools of thought have 
emerged, each with a different interpretation about what is necessary 
to show that the buyer is knowingly benefitting from an illegal 
enterprise and thereby convictable of conspiracy. Each school grounds 
its interpretation in a different conception of the buyer-seller rule’s 
purpose and has been adopted as the controlling law in a different 
federal circuit as discussed below. Although examining the different 
conceptions of this rule’s purpose might seem on the surface to be 
unimportant and overly academic, recognizing the divide between 
these interpretations is critical to understanding why different 
jurisdictions apply this rule in different ways. After all, it was this 
inconsistent application of the rule that produced the twelve-year 
sentencing disparity seen in Loveland and Gallegos.69 
II 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES IN THE BUYER-SELLER RULE’S 
ADMINISTRATION 
A. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits: Additional Factors Jurisdictions
The first approach to the buyer-seller rule’s administration that this
Comment will examine is that of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits. These 
two circuits base their interpretation of the buyer-seller rule on the first 
of the two major schools of thought on the rule’s purpose. This school 
views the buyer-seller rule not so much as an independent requirement 
in a conspiracy case, but rather as a check to make sure that the 
agreement element of the conspiracy is satisfied.70 Subscribers to this 
ideology argue that a deal for a seller to sell drugs to a buyer does not 
involve a meeting of the minds for the common illegal purpose of 
distributing drugs.71 Instead, they find that “[i]n such circumstances, 
the buyer’s purpose is to buy; the seller’s purpose is to sell.”72 
Accordingly, the two parties to the transaction have not come to the 
69 See supra note 2. 
70 State v. Allan, 83 A.3d 326, 335 (Conn. 2014) (describing the two different approaches 
of the buyer-seller rule by federal Circuit Courts). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. (quoting United States v. Donnell, 596 F.3d 913, 924–25 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
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necessary agreement required to sustain a conspiracy charge.73 These 
courts view the buyer-seller relationship not as an exception to the 
conspiracy doctrine but rather as “a failure of proof of conspiracy.”74 
Accordingly, to overcome the buyer-seller rule’s protections, these 
jurisdictions look for additional factors beyond just the sale itself to 
prove that the parties had a deeper relationship and a more substantial 
stake in the venture.75 The particular factors important to each circuit 
and the weight attributed to each individual factor, however, can vary 
even among these “factors jurisdictions.” These differences will 
become apparent by reviewing some of the prominent case law in each 
jurisdiction. 
1. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit is particularly clear about the factors relevant to
the buyer-seller analysis as it provides a list of the factors that it views 
as most important in its pattern jury instructions.76 Pattern jury 
instruction 9.19A provides that: 
In considering whether the evidence supports the existence of a 
conspiracy or the existence of a buyer-seller relationship, you should 
consider all the evidence, including the following factors: 
(1) whether the sales were made on credit or consignment;
(2) the frequency of the sales;
(3) the quantity of the sales;
(4) the level of trust demonstrated between the buyer and the
seller, including the use of codes;
(5) the length of time during which the sales were ongoing;
(6) whether the transactions were standardized;
(7) whether the parties advised each other on the conduct of the
other’s business;
(8) whether the buyer assisted the seller by looking for other
customers;
(9) and whether the parties agreed to warn each other of
potential threats from competitors or law enforcement.77
73 Id. 
74 United States v. Loveland, 825 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 2016). 
75 See, e.g., id. at 562 (explaining that providing drugs to another on credit or conducting 
sales on consignment serves as sufficient enough evidence to prove that the seller had a 
stake in the venture). 
76 MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 9.19A (9TH CIR. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS COMM. 2010) (updated 2018). 
77 Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit warns, however, that this is only a list of possible 
relevant factors and that the presence or absence of any particular factor 
is not necessarily dispositive as this is a very flexible and highly 
context-dependent analysis.78 In order to sort out what combination of 
these factors indicates a relationship that goes beyond mere buyer-
seller dealings, an examination of the case law is in order. 
One of the circuit’s more illuminating decisions on the matter comes 
in the case United States v. Lapier.79 In Lapier, the defendant was 
indicted for conspiring to distribute drugs after purchasing a 
considerable amount of methamphetamine from an associate, intending 
to redistribute it.80 The evidence adduced at trial revealed that the two 
individuals had engaged in a series of transactions over the span of a 
year during which the defendant purchased somewhere in the range of 
three to three and a half pounds of methamphetamine.81 Moreover, 
there was evidence that many of the transactions were carried out using 
a “fronting” system wherein the supplier would provide drugs to the 
defendant without being paid on the expectation that the defendant 
would sell the drugs and then pay the supplier back later.82 In analyzing 
the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, the court focused in 
particular on the fronting behavior.83 Fronting the drugs is unique 
among the factors because it necessitates not only knowledge that the 
buyer will redistribute the drugs but also the seller’s vested stake in the 
buyer’s redistribution on the part of the seller as it is the only way that 
the seller gets paid.84 The fronting, taken together with the frequent 
sales, was enough to show that there was a conspiracy to distribute 
drugs in play rather than merely an agreement to sell them.85 
United States v. Moe provides another permutation of factors that is 
sufficient to support a finding of conspiracy.86 In Moe, the defendant 
was indicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine based on 
evidence that she purchased roughly 140 grams of methamphetamine 
in seven different transactions over the course of a year.87 During these 
78 Id.; see also Loveland, 825 F.3d at 561 (discussing factors). 




83 Id. at 1095. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 781 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2015). 
87 Id. at 1123. 
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transactions, the defendant and her supplier contacted each other by 
phone at least ninety-four separate times.88 While making the 
methamphetamine sales, the defendant and her supplier communicated 
about the availability of the product through codes, like the supplier 
telling the defendant that the weather was bad when he had no product 
for sale.89 Moreover, the government also introduced evidence that the 
buyer and seller used the exact same code to warn each other about law 
enforcement activity on at least one occasion when the supplier’s house 
was being searched.90 Though the court was not specific about the 
weight of each individual factor in its calculation, it made clear that in 
the aggregate, these factors indicated that the parties maintained a 
relationship of mutual trust.91 Furthermore, the court explained that 
when all these factors are taken together along with the fact that the 
defendant’s supplier knew that the defendant was redistributing the 
drugs, they support the conclusion that the supplier had a vested interest 
in the defendant’s sales.92 This sort of interest in turn then supports a 
conviction for conspiracy.93 
So, all in all, the Ninth Circuit shows us that the key inquiry in 
determining whether two individuals are engaged in a conspiracy is 
whether the seller of drugs has a vested stake in the buyer’s resale. 
There are multiple combinations of factors that can support such a 
conclusion, although the case law is clear that certain factors receive 
more weight. For example, in Lapier, the court made its decision 
almost entirely based on one factor—the sales on credit—and 
understandably so. Making sales on credit is unique among the factors 
because it is the one and only factor that, in and of itself, necessitates 
the seller having a stake in the buyer’s redistribution of the drugs. 
Otherwise, the seller does not actually get anything out of the 
agreement. Accordingly, in light of the inquiry the circuit uses, it makes 
sense that the court assigns this factor so much weight. 
By contrast, the larger group of factors seen in Moe receive less 
weight individually as no single one of them necessarily requires that 
the buyer has a stake in the resale. However, because the agreement in 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1123–24. 
90 Id. at 1126. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 1126–27. 
93 Id. at 1127. 
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conspiracy can be inferred from circumstantial evidence,94 these 
factors when taken together can support the inference that the 
defendant has some sort of stake in the buyer’s redistribution. Beyond 
this general understanding, however, this approach is unclear about 
when enough of these factors are present to uphold a conspiracy 
conviction. 
2. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit takes a similar approach to the Ninth Circuit,
though it does not rely on a preset list of factors for consideration. 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit allows individual courts to weigh 
whichever factors they find relevant in making their decisions. Pattern 
jury instruction 5.10(A) provides that “[t]o establish that a [buyer or 
seller] knowingly became a member of a conspiracy with a [buyer or 
seller] to [distribute [name of drug] . . . the government must prove that 
the buyer and seller had the joint criminal objective of distributing 
[name of drug] to others.”95 At one point, the Seventh Circuit had a 
similar pattern instruction to the Ninth Circuit that did list factors, but 
it later revised the instruction over criticism that giving jurors an entire 
list of factors to consider, many of which do not relate to the case at 
hand, might lead to juror confusion.96 Although this change was 
originally made with the intent of alleviating confusion among jurors, 
it in some sense muddies the waters as to what sort of conduct 
demonstrates an enhanced level of trust and investment that merits a 
conspiracy conviction. This lack of clarity ultimately has to be sorted 
out in case law. 
In United States v. Colon, an early case in the new list-free era, the 
Seventh Circuit made its first attempt to identify what sort of conduct 
represents something greater than a buyer-seller relationship.97 There, 
the defendant was convicted of conspiracy based on his regular 
business transactions with a cocaine dealer for standardized amounts 
of cocaine.98 The Seventh Circuit reversed, however, making the 
sweeping determination that regular purchases on standard terms can 
94 United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009). 
95 PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 5.10(A) 
(COMM. ON FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2012). 
96 United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing a previous 
version of the Seventh Circuit’s conspiracy instructions). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 567. 
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never alone form the basis for a conspiracy.99 Regular transactions in 
standard amounts, the court said, suggest no greater level of mutual 
trust between the buyer and seller than that which is present in an 
ordinary person’s regular and standardized transactions at Walmart.100 
Instead, the court suggested several other factors that are more strongly 
indicative of a conspiratorial relationship: finding new customers for 
one another, advising each other on the business, receiving a 
commission on sales, or warning each other about competitors or law 
enforcement.101 Accordingly, it was clear that the Seventh Circuit 
would also require more to push a defendant’s conduct into the realm 
of conspiracy. 
Another attempt to probe the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the 
buyer-seller rule would come in United States v. Johnson.102 In 
Johnson, the government offered a laundry list of evidence about the 
relationship between the defendant and his supplier, including evidence 
that the defendant received discounts from the supplier, brought in a 
friend as a new customer, warned the supplier about law enforcement 
activity, purchased drugs in standardized quantities, then resold the 
drugs, and made more than 300 calls to the supplier over a ten-month 
period.103 The Seventh Circuit still refused to crack, however, despite 
previously explaining that warnings about law enforcement activity 
and bringing in new customers were indications of a relationship going 
beyond a buyer-seller relationship.104 The court distinguished the 
evidence of the relevant factors in this case from what it had envisioned 
at the time of delineating them by finding that the act of bringing one 
new customer to the supplier does not truly constitute an agreement to 
distribute drugs and that any other factors suggesting a deeper 
relationship were no more than isolated incidents that are alone 
insufficient.105 Fine as this may be, it still begs the question: If not this 
fact pattern, then what will it take for the Seventh Circuit to find that a 
relationship falls outside the scope of buyer-seller protection? 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 567–68. 
101 Id. at 570. 
102 United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2010). 
103 Id. at 756–57. 
104 Id. at 755–56. 
105 Id. at 757. 
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The Seventh Circuit answered this question in United States v. 
Vallar.106 In that case, the government presented evidence that the 
defendant and his supplier had engaged in a standardized series of 
transactions involving large quantities of cocaine wherein the 
defendant would take the drugs on credit and not pay his supplier until 
the drugs had been resold.107 When the Seventh Circuit reviewed the 
case, it concluded that the government had presented sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate a relationship going beyond that of a buyer 
and seller.108 That determination was largely predicated on the 
defendant having received drugs on credit. Such a transaction 
evidences a sort of mutual trust between the buyer and seller that is not 
present in an arms-length buyer-seller transaction.109 Even still, 
however, the court warns that sales on credit or consignment are not 
enough if presented alone. Such sales at a minimum have to be 
accompanied by standardization of transactions or consistent 
transactions for distribution-level quantities over time.110 Nonetheless, 
Vallar indicates that in the Seventh Circuit sales on credit carry 
significant weight when determining whether there is a deep 
conspiratorial relationship. 
Overall, the Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence on the buyer-seller rule, 
despite not being defined by a limited set of factors, still bears a lot of 
resemblance to the Ninth Circuit’s take on the issue. Both jurisdictions 
clearly place a lot of weight on the practice of fronting drugs or other 
credit-based sales schemes, and they consider a number of lesser 
factors as well, such as the length of ongoing transactions, the amount 
of drugs transacted for, the warnings made to suppliers about law 
enforcement, and many others. 
Where the two circuits materially diverge, however, is in each 
circuit’s willingness to agree that a conspiratorial relationship can exist 
in the absence of sales on credit. In the Ninth Circuit’s Moe case, the 
court was willing to find a conspiratorial relationship, despite the 
absence of credit sales, when a number of other factors were present—
including making regular transactions, using codes with her supplier, 
and warning her supplier about law enforcement. By contrast, in the 
Seventh Circuit’s most comparable case, Johnson, the court declined 
106 635 F.3d 271 (7th Cir. 2011). 
107 Id. at 287. 
108 Id. at 287–88. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 287. 
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to find such a relationship even though a litany of factors other than 
credit were present—including making regular and standardized 
transactions, warning about law enforcement, and bringing in new 
customers. Johnson indicates that the Seventh Circuit places even more 
weight on credit sales than the Ninth Circuit to the point that credit 
sales nearly becomes the deciding factor in and of itself. 
Another noteworthy distinction is that the weight that the Seventh 
Circuit assigns to individual factors might not even remain consistent 
across cases. By the circuit’s own admission, the buyer-seller analysis 
is inconsistent and contradictory when it comes to assigning weight to 
individual factors.111 After all, the entire inquiry is very circumstantial, 
focusing on the specific facts of the case at hand. This approach, the 
court believes, allows it to stay focused on the big picture of 
determining whether there is a deep relationship between the 
individuals instead of unintelligently and mechanically determining the 
nature of the relationship based on weights preassigned to individual 
factors in entirely different scenarios.112 
B. The Tenth Circuit: A Redistribution and Interdependence
Jurisdiction 
In contrast to the flexible and situational factors-focused test of the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a much more 
rigid but clear-cut interpretation of the buyer-seller rule. This circuit’s 
interpretation is based on the second main school of thought about the 
policy behind the rule. This school views the buyer-seller rule as an 
actual exception to what would otherwise be conspiratorial liability.113 
Proponents of this interpretation believe that such an exception is 
necessary in order to ensure that those who buy drugs for personal use 
are not swept out into a sea of conspiratorial liability, but still allows 
greater punishment for street-level, mid-level, and other higher-level 
dealers.114 This rule, they argue, reflects a policy judgement: Those 
who merely purchase drugs in order to feed a personal addiction are 
less criminally culpable than those involved in a conspiracy.115 By 
contrast, those who exploit end users’ addictions for their own profit at 
111 United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1002 (7th Cir. 2013). 
112 Id. 
113 State v. Allan, 83 A.3d 326, 335 (Conn. 2014). 
114 United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1285–86 (10th Cir. 1996). 
115 United States v. Parker, 554 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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the expense of the users’ health and welfare are considered to be 
substantially more criminally culpable.116 The Tenth Circuit’s pattern 
jury instructions are actually silent on the subject of the buyer-seller 
rule, but case law has made clear where the circuit stands in its 
interpretation.117 
The definitive explanation of the Tenth Circuit’s position comes in 
the case United States v. Ivy.118 In Ivy, the government presented 
evidence on the number of times that the defendant purchased drugs 
from various people who were concededly members of a conspiracy 
and resold them to others for a profit.119 The defendant argued that this 
evidence was insufficient to link him to the conspiracy in anything 
beyond a buyer-seller capacity.120 The Tenth Circuit rejected his 
argument, holding that “the purpose of the buyer-seller rule is to 
separate consumers, who do not plan to redistribute the drugs for profit, 
from street-level, mid-level, and other distributors, who do intend to 
distribute drugs for profit, thereby furthering the objective of the 
conspiracy.”121 As the defendant in Ivy had clearly distributed drugs 
for profit, the court held that the buyer-seller rule was no defense to his 
conspiracy charge.122 In Ivy, the interpretation of the buyer-seller rule 
is substantially narrower than the one advanced by the Ninth and 
Seventh Circuits, but this is not even the end of the story. 
On top of the rule’s already limited scope, the Tenth Circuit 
narrowed the rule even further in United States v. Flores.123 There, a 
drug dealer attempted to invoke the buyer-seller rule as a defense to 
accusations that he—by selling drugs to the conspiracy’s members—
had participated in a conspiracy.124 The court was unpersuaded, 
however, and instead came to exactly the opposite conclusion. 
Specifically, a seller of drugs falls outside the bounds of the rule’s 
protection per se.125 This decision was predicated on the same 
understanding of the rule’s purpose that produced the Ivy holding—the 
116 Id. 
117 CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.87 (CRIM. PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTION COMM. OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT 2011) (updated 2018). 
118 83 F.3d at 1266. 
119 Id. at 1286. 
120 Id. at 1284. 
121 Id. at 1285–86. 
122 Id. at 1286. 
123 149 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 1998). 
124 Id. at 1277. 
125 Id. 
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buyer-seller rule is intended to protect the less culpable end users of 
drugs, not those that sell them for profit.126 With a scope as wide as 
this, the natural question becomes just what sort of scenario actually 
merits protection under the rule? 
Another Tenth Circuit case, United States v. McIntyre, provides the 
answer.127 In McIntyre, the defendant was accused of conspiracy after 
he purchased cocaine from a number of different people in unrelated 
transactions, which he shared with his friends.128 The court found that 
evidence insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction because a 
series of unrelated drug transactions that the defendant did not intend 
to redistribute for profit does not indicate the presence of a common 
purpose to possess and redistribute cocaine.129 This case, besides 
showing the outer limit of what is protected under the buyer-seller rule, 
also speaks again to the circuit’s understanding that whether someone 
redistributed for profit makes or breaks his or her eligibility for the 
rule’s safeguard. 
Now here is where things get a little more complicated. Although 
the Tenth Circuit has interpreted the buyer-seller rule itself extremely 
narrowly, it is neither fair to the circuit nor legally appropriate to look 
at this rule’s interpretation in isolation. This is because the Tenth 
Circuit has pioneered the development of a whole new essential 
element for the crime of conspiracy that helps bridge the gap between 
its interpretation of the buyer-seller rule and the interpretations of other 
jurisdictions: interdependence.130 As case law defines it, 
interdependence exists where the parties charged “inten[d] to act 
together for their shared mutual benefit within the scope of the 
conspiracy.”131 Taken on its face, this element seems to require 
something similar to the deep relationship of mutual trust and a vested 
126 Id. 
127 836 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1987). 
128 Id. at 469. 
129 Id. at 472. 
130 See CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.87 (CRIM. PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTION COMM. OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT 2011); Jeff Van der Veer, Comment, Varying 
Declarations of Interdependence: The Tenth Circuit’s Inconsistent Analysis of Criminal 
Conspiracy, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 341–42 (2011). 
131 United States v. Caldwell, 589 F.3d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 2009) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 671 (10th Cir. 
1992)). 
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interest that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits look for. In practice, 
however, this element has been interpreted somewhat differently. 
In determining whether or not there was an interdependent 
relationship between coconspirators, the courts are particularly 
interested in the structure of the alleged conspiracy.132 The prototypical 
example of conspiratorial structure is what the court refers to as a 
chain-and-link conspiracy.133 In a chain-and-link conspiracy, drugs 
begin at the top of a vertical chain in the hands of a larger dealer and 
work down the chain in a series of buyer-seller transactions until they 
reach the end user at the bottom.134 A chain-and-link system of 
distribution is interdependent because “each alleged coconspirator . . . 
depend[s] on the operation of each link in the chain to achieve the 
common goal.”135 This interdependence is the same as the kind seen in 
legitimate business, where a manufacturer successively sells 
merchandise to a wholesaler, who then sells to a retailer, who then 
finally sells to a consumer.136 
In contrast to the chain-and-link model for conspiracy, the Tenth 
Circuit has identified a second type of conspiracy that spreads more 
horizontally: the wagon wheel model.137 In a wagon wheel conspiracy, 
the whole structure stems from someone in the hub of the metaphorical 
wheel who supplies a number of alleged conspirators with drugs in 
independent transactions, which form the spokes.138 This wagon wheel 
structure, however, is insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction 
on its own as each spoke is nothing more than an independent 
transaction without interdependence with the other spokes.139 In order 
to make a viable case out of a hub and spoke system, the spokes must 
be joined by a shared objective in order to connect each spoke and form 




135 Evans, 970 F.2d at 670 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 
1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
136 Id. at 668 n.8. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 670. 
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the full conspiratorial wheel.140 Only then will the circuit uphold a 
conspiracy conviction.141 
Although the interdependence analysis serves a similar function to 
the other jurisdictions’ factors analysis—ensuring that alleged 
coconspirators all have a significant shared criminal objective—its 
focus on structure and mechanical chain-like functioning, as opposed 
to the deeper relationship of mutual trust, can produce very different 
results. 
This phenomenon is exemplified by the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Cornelius.142 In Cornelius, the defendant was a gang 
member who was convicted of conspiracy to distribute crack 
cocaine.143 He appealed his sentence, arguing that the government had 
failed to prove the necessary interdependence element.144 The court 
rejected his argument, however, holding that evidence of repeated sales 
to others who resold the drugs was entirely sufficient to support a jury 
finding of interdependence, and therefore, conspiracy.145 
Other cases in the Tenth Circuit further corroborate this 
understanding of the interdependence requirement. In United States v. 
Wright, the court held that the defendant’s repeated sales of drugs to 
someone who later resold them was interdependent because “the buyer-
seller relationship is patently an interdependent one.”146 Similarly, the 
court in United States v. Small held that a defendant who repeatedly 
purchases drugs from a conspirator for the purposes of resale is 
interdependent with the conspiracy.147 This interpretation produces 
results that contrast starkly with those observed in the Ninth and 
Seventh Circuits. Applying the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ approach 
to the rule, courts have repeatedly found that cases of continued sales 
between a buyer and seller fell well within the rule’s protected space.148 
140 Id. at 670–71; see also Note, Federal Treatment of Multiple Conspiracies, 57 COLUM. 
L. REV. 387, 388 (1957).
141 Evans, 970 F.2d at 670–71.
142 696 F.3d 1307, 1318 (10th Cir. 2012).
143 Id. at 1313.
144 Id. at 1317.
145 Id. at 1318.
146 506 F.3d 1293, 1299 (10th Cir. 2007).
147 423 F.3d 1164, 1183 (10th Cir. 2005).
148 See, e.g., United States v. Loveland, 825 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Lapier, 796 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit’s approach to the buyer-seller rule and 
interdependence requirement is properly characterized as much less 
protective than that of the other circuits. 
III 
THE NINTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS’ INTERPRETATION OF THE 
BUYER-SELLER RULE SHOULD BE ADOPTED AS A UNIFORM 
NATIONAL RULE 
When it comes right down to it, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ 
approach to the buyer-seller rule proves to be the better way of 
approaching this doctrine for two critical reasons. First, this approach 
most faithfully adheres to what the doctrine of conspiracy is and targets 
the conduct that the Supreme Court has identified as the most harmful 
and worthy of deterrence. The Tenth Circuit’s approach, by contrast, 
fails to most accurately target this same conduct. Second, this narrower 
approach to determining what sort of conduct is proscribed by the 
statute seems to square best with Congress’s intent as expressed 
through the existence of other statutes on the same topic. 
A. Adherence to the Conspiracy Doctrine and Deterrence
 of Harmful Conduct 
If nothing else, the history of the conspiracy doctrine makes one 
thing very clear: it is all in the agreement. Since its earliest times, the 
conspiracy doctrine has focused on punishing the agreement and 
confederation between two parties who have the goal of violating the 
law—a focus that endures even into the modern era. In several cases 
during the past hundred years, the Supreme Court has been very clear 
that the focus of the law is on preventing the agreement.149 In fact, the 
Court has gone so far as to say the act alone of scheming and plotting 
to subvert the law is sometimes of graver and more dangerous character 
than the crime conspired to.150 This, the Court says, is because careful 
planning and preparation to commit a crime with others both increases 
the likelihood that the ultimate endeavor will succeed and decreases the 
likelihood that any of its members will get cold feet and back out before 
committing the contemplated crime.151 Given that the Court has put so 
much emphasis on the harmfulness of the agreement in a conspiracy, it 
149 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946). 
150 Id. (quoting United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915)). 
151 Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961). 
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only seems fitting that the conspiracy law itself, and its interpretation 
in the courts, should be geared toward punishing the agreement itself 
to commit the crime. Accordingly, the question then becomes how well 
the buyer-seller rule interpretations respect the ultimate goal of 
punishing the agreement or scheme to commit a crime. 
In this regard, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ approach—using a 
list of factors to determine whether there is a deep mutual trust and 
vested interest in the scheme—is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
approach. Courts in these jurisdictions consistently take extra care to 
ensure that the conspiracy statute is applied only to those defendants 
whose conduct could hardly occur absent some sort of scheme. The 
most common example that appears in both jurisdictions concerns 
fronting. In these cases, courts, with good reason, place substantial 
weight on the presence of a fronting system between two individuals 
when one is already involved in the conspiracy.152 Evidence of a drug 
fronting system is tantamount to direct evidence that the parties have 
plotted something beyond an arm’s length transaction. A fronting 
system requires an agreement based on trust between the two parties to 
commit a crime beyond the single sale itself. 
Aside from evidence of a fronting system, the other factors that this 
approach considers, albeit with less weight, are also all relevant in 
suggesting an agreement beyond just the immediate sale. Take the 
Ninth Circuit’s Moe case as an example.153 There, the factors 
considered were that the defendant and her supplier made transactions 
over the course of a year, that they had used special coded language, 
and that they warned each other about law enforcement activity.154 All 
these factors suggest that mutual trust exists between the parties that is 
deeper than the trust between a separate buyer and seller, which, in turn, 
indicates that there might be a conspiratorial agreement in play. 
Further, whether parties use code is particularly relevant to conspiracy 
cases, as it is extremely unlikely that parties can use code without some 
sort of pre-planning or coordination. 
Overall, it is clear that the factors that the Ninth Circuit has expressly 
listed and the Seventh Circuit has identified in case law bear on whether 
the parties had agreed to commit some offense beyond the actual sale 
152 See, e.g., Lapier, 796 F.3d at 1094; United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 287 (7th 
Cir. 2011). 
153 United States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2015). 
154 Id. at 1123. 
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itself. This in no small sense justifies the circuits’ interpretations of the 
buyer-seller rule, as these interpretations are directly probative of what 
the Supreme Court considers to be the most dangerous part of a 
conspiracy—the agreement.155 
Although its additional interdependence requirement is a step in the 
right direction, the Tenth Circuit’s approach to the buyer-seller rule 
misses the mark. Conspiracy should focus on punishing the agreement 
to commit a crime. The Tenth Circuit, however, seems much more 
interested in punishing the sale of the drugs than it is in punishing the 
agreement to distribute them. Protecting end users has little to do with 
punishing those who would plot and agree to distribute drugs. In fact, 
the end-user-only interpretation borders on redundant as the end users 
that it purports to protect are already virtually impossible to prosecute 
for conspiring to distribute a controlled substance. This is because one 
of the essential elements of a conspiracy charge is that the defendant 
has the requisite mens rea to commit the substantive offense conspired 
to, in this case, distributing a controlled substance. The problem here is 
that an end user will virtually never have this necessary mens rea as he 
or she will intend to use the drugs, not distribute them. The people who 
remain unprotected by this rule, however, are buyers who make a 
onetime arm’s-length drug purchase for redistribution without any 
further agreement from the seller. In doing so, the buyer unwittingly 
makes him or herself into a coconspirator when it turns out that the 
seller was a member of a much larger conspiracy. 
Although the Tenth Circuit has interpreted the buyer-seller rule 
narrowly, whether it was proper to do so can be viewed fairly only in 
light of the circuit’s unique requirement of interdependence between 
conspirators. Common sense would suggest that it is difficult for two 
conspirators to get involved in a chain-link structure for distribution 
and become interdependent on one another without agreeing to what is 
at the heart of the crime. The fact of the matter is, however, that 
substantial likelihood is not the same as certainty. If a drug dealer buys 
drugs several times from someone higher up the chain with the intent 
of redistributing, but does not agree to or discuss anything beyond the 
sale or meet any other members in the chain, the circuit has suggested 
that such evidence is sufficient to satisfy the interdependence 
requirement. Even if the courts find a conspiracy because neither party 
could accomplish their objective without the operation of the other link 
155 Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644 (quoting Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88). 
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in the chain, there is still no big picture agreement between the parties 
in this scenario. Though the parties are certainly criminally culpable in 
some sense, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation punishes those who have 
not actually caused the harm that the conspiracy statute was intended 
to prevent. 
B. Conformance with Congress’s Intent for the Statute
In addition to ensuring that drug conspiracy prosecutions target the 
proper conduct, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ narrower 
interpretation of the buyer-seller rule seems to most accurately conform 
to Congress’s intent for who the statute was meant to punish. Although 
the legislative history of the provision is not particularly revealing, 
Congress’s intent is apparent from the statutory scheme of the federal 
drug laws. The conspiracy statute is hardly the only show in town when 
it comes to federal drug laws to prosecute under. In addition to the 
conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841156 prevents the substantive offense 
of manufacturing or distributing controlled substances and 21 U.S.C. § 
844157 prohibits the simple possession of a controlled substance. Yet 
another section of 21 U.S.C. § 846 provides the same penalty for 
attempting to distribute or possess a controlled substance.158 At a 
minimum, it is clear that Congress carefully considered a wide variety 
of conduct and the varying degree of harm that it can cause when 
Congress created the offenses under this chapter and assigned specific 
penalties to each, making it difficult to argue that Congress intended 
for one particular section to be read more broadly than it appears on its 
face. 
On that point, it is worth discussing in more detail the attempt prong 
of § 846. In many ways, the attempt prong is very similar to the 
conspiracy prong because it also punishes the inchoate offense of 
manufacturing and distributing a controlled substance. However, 
unlike with conspiracy, an attempt conviction does not require an actual 
agreement between the parties. Instead, it only requires the possessing 
and distributing parties to take a substantial step toward completing a 
crime, something the review of case law shows that defendants often 
do in conspiracies.159 This is a less demanding requirement. In light of 
156 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012). 
157 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2012). 
158 21 U.S.C. § 846. 
159 United States v. Ramirez, 348 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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this fact, it makes little sense to take the position that Congress intended 
the conspiracy statute to be interpreted broadly and encroach into the 
realm of attempt when there is another prong of the same statute right 
beside it to catch defendants and cases that fall short of conspiracy. 
In fact, there is likely another principled reason for arguing that 
Congress intended a sharper distinction between conspiracy and other 
drug crimes—the Pinkerton liability that comes attached to a 
conspiracy conviction. Liability for all the reasonably foreseeable 
offenses committed by coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy 
can make a huge difference in terms of punishment. It can be the 
difference between a sentence of years on a lesser drug offense and 
decades in prison when you include Pinkerton. Given how powerful of 
a tool this is, Congress likely wanted to limit its applicability both to 
avoid punishing lesser offenders too harshly, and to avoid obliterating 
the distinction between the penalties for less severe offenses and for 
conspiracies. 
Overall, there are several important reasons why the Ninth and 
Seventh Circuits’ narrow interpretation of buyer-seller rule liability is 
the more appropriate interpretation for the court system as a whole. 
IV 
OBJECTIONS AND THE COUNTERARGUMENT FOR THE TENTH 
CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
Although several reasons support the adoption of the Ninth and 
Seventh Circuits’ interpretation of the buyer-seller rule, there is still a 
valid counterargument in favor of the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation. 
The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation provides much clearer notice of what 
sort of conduct is prohibited and of the penalty affixed to it. 
In our criminal justice system, a cornerstone concept of justice is the 
idea of notice, which is inherent in the Due Process Clause. A 
defendant has to have had notice both of the nature of prohibited 
conduct and of the penalties that he or she will incur for engaging in 
it.160 When it comes to statutory analysis, the idea that notice is so 
essential lives in the judicially developed “void for vagueness” 
doctrine.161 Under this doctrine, the courts will invalidate a statute that 
fails to give an ordinary person notice of the conduct that it punishes 
160 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015). 
161 Id. 
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and of the range of available sentences for the conduct.162 The idea 
behind the notice requirement is that punishing someone for something 
is fair only if he or she had warning that there was a particular 
punishment attached to that conduct.163 The vagueness doctrine itself, 
has generally been used to evaluate statutes.164 Nonetheless, that does 
not mean that the principle of notice that underlies the doctrine cannot 
be used as an important metric to informally evaluate other facets of 
the criminal justice system. After all, there is hardly a salient difference 
in fairness between an individual being punished based on an unclear 
judicial interpretation of a statute and an individual being punished 
based on an unclear statute itself. Accordingly, applying the vagueness 
test informally to the different circuits’ interpretations of the buyer-
seller rule could make for a valid critique regarding the fairness of each 
method. In fact, such an analysis might even prove necessary in the 
context of the conspiracy statute. Even though the conduct that the 
statute prohibits (the agreement) is seemingly clear, the parties might 
not realize they formed an agreement. Accordingly, a potential 
defendant must have adequate notice of the conduct that might be 
interpreted as indicating an agreement. 
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ factors-based analysis, though 
flexible, proves problematic in the face of a vagueness analysis. The 
issue with using a factors test is that it is rarely ever clear how many of 
the factors a defendant has to check off before coming within the 
bounds of the statute or what weight is given to each individual factor. 
Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit even pointed out, the difficulties in 
weighing these factors are often compounded by the inconsistency of 
judicial decisions on the subject.165 
These problems are apparent in both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. 
In the Seventh Circuit, for example, the court has made a decision like 
Johnson, where the court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to 
162 E.g., Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017); Peter W. Low & Joel S. 
Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary of the Vagueness Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2052 
(2015). 
163 San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1992). 
164 See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010) (“[A] penal statute [must] 
define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.” (first alteration not in original) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)). 
165 United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1002 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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support a conspiracy conviction, even though it found evidence that the 
parties (1) engaged in repeated sales, (2) engaged in these sales over a 
ten-month period, (3) dealt in standardized quantities, (4) had a 
prolonged relationship of mutual trust, and (5) warned each other about 
law enforcement activity.166 However, the court has then gone and 
made a decision like Vallar, where it held that evidence of suppliers 
fronting drugs to the defendant on two or three occasions alone was 
sufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction.167 I bring up these 
examples not to criticize the court’s decision in either case as incorrect, 
but rather to point out how, despite identifying all these as relevant 
factors, the invisible weight attached to certain factors can produce 
results that are not intuitively apparent to someone unfamiliar with case 
law. 
Likewise, in the Ninth Circuit, the court has made decisions like 
Lapier, where it also held that a fronting deal alone was sufficient to 
sustain a conviction. However, the same court also made the Moe 
decision, wherein the defendant and supplier had to (1) coordinate 
closely to indicate mutual trust, (2) engage in a year’s worth of 
transactions, (3) use codes to communicate, and (4) warn each other 
about law enforcement in order to support a conspiracy conviction. 
Again, these decisions are not necessarily incorrect, just unpredictable, 
which does not sit well with the notice requirement of the Due Process 
Clause. 
By contrast, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation for determining 
whether two parties have made an agreement is much clearer and more 
consistent. First and foremost, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
buyer-seller rule is supremely clear as to when the rule applies. If an 
individual is an end user of drugs, that person is protected. All others 
are not. Whether you agree with this interpretation or not, it is 
undeniable that this system is predictable and easy to understand. Now 
when you toss in the additional requirement of interdependence the 
water muddies a bit, but is far from unnavigable. The circuit’s relatively 
literal interpretation of the word “interdependent” has led to a pretty 
clear definition. If the defendant depended on a conspirator or a 
conspirator depended on the defendant such that neither would achieve 
their goal if the other failed to perform, then you have interdependence. 
166 United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2010). 
167 United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 287 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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Again, like it or not, this method of determination is certainly 
straightforward. 
Overall, given that our criminal law system, and even legal system 
at large, aspires to achieve predictability when it comes to an 
individual’s liability and what sort of conduct will be penalized, the 
Tenth Circuit’s approach has to be praised for its consistency. 
Likewise, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ factors system are 
vulnerable to some criticism because they can produce inconsistent and 
confusing rulings. Notably, this sort of reliability and predictability is 
all the more important in the context of conspiracy law because the 
stakes are often higher here than in other criminal law due to Pinkerton 
liability. The court’s determination of whether someone does or does 
not fall within the scope of a conspiracy is often the difference between 
escaping liability and being held responsible for a whole litany of 
offenses committed by coconspirators. 
CONCLUSION 
If you take one thing away from this Comment, let it be this: the 
incongruity in conspiracy law needs to be resolved. One defendant 
losing twelve years of her life while the other walks away scot-free 
despite engaging in substantially the same conduct is simply too 
significant of a disparity to ignore. In terms of how to resolve it, the 
factors-focused interpretation of the buyer-seller rule advanced by the 
Ninth and Seventh Circuits seems to be the best way, because it most 
accurately targets the conduct the conspiracy is supposed to deter. It 
also most closely aligns with what all indicators suggest was 
Congress’s intent in passing the statute. In order to actually resolve this 
disparity, the matter will likely have to be taken up again by the 
Supreme Court. The Court has not addressed the buyer-seller rule in 
nearly seventy years; in no small sense the doctrine is due for a refresh. 
Moreover, as the number of cases illustrating the same sort of disparity 
in results grows, the pressure to address the question will only grow 
along with it, making it more and more likely that this topic will receive 
the final edict it needs to remedy the divide. Until that day, however, 
we will just have to make do with what we have, trying our best to work 
with what the courts have given us. 
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